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Federal venue restrictionsfor suits against national banks held inapplicable to third-party claims
Under federal law, a national bank may be sued in a state court
in the county or city in which it is located.29 Although the language
of the applicable venue statute appears to be permissive, in
Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 97 the United States Supreme Court held that "national banks may be sued only in those
' Recently,
state courts in the county where the banks are located."298
however, in Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel v. Castle Capital
in the litigation of disputes. New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, Inc.,
294 N.Y. 480, 493-94, 63 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1945); see Weiner v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., 55
App. Div. 2d 189, 191, 389 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1976). Such finality is considered
essential for securing the rights and obligations of the parties and in preventing harrassing
and vexatious relitigation of.controversies. VESTAL, supra note 269, at V-7 to 10; see von
Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 299-300 (1929); 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 820 (1952).
Furthermore, finality of adjudications promotes consideration of judicial economy and the
integrity of determinations made by courts of competent jurisdiction. VESTAL, supra note 269,
at V-10 to 12; see D. SIEGEL, supra note 267, § 442; von Moschzisker, supra at 300-01. Due to
these considerations, "recent years have seen a marked expansion by the courts of the doctrine of res judicata." H. WAcHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 451 (5th ed. 1976).
"96
The venue provision of the National Bank Act provides in pertinent part that
"[sluits. . .against any. . .[national bank] . . .may be had in any ... State. . .court
in the county or city in which said [national bank] is located." 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976). Until
recently, the meaning of the term "located" as used in § 94 had been uncertain. New York
courts held that, for purposes of § 94, a bank is "located" and therefore could be sued, only
in that county in which its principal office is situated. E.g., Thomas v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank,
58 App. Div. 2d 1001, 396 N.Y.S.2d 946 (4th Dep't 1977) (mem.); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons,
Inc. v. Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't 1966); Stephen-Leedom
Carpet Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 25 App. Div. 2d 645, 268 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't
1966) (meri.). Courts in other jurisdictions, however, held that a national bank is "located"
in any county in which it operates a branch office. E.g., Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972); Holson v. Gosnell,
264 S.C. 619, 216 S.E.2d 539 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976). The issue was resolved
in Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 45 (1977), wherein the United States
Supreme Court adopted the latter position. For a critical discussion of the Citizens decision,
see Steinberg, Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas-Achieving Justice Under the
Venue Provisions of the National Bank Act, 12 GA. L. Rav. 161, 170-73 (1978).
371 U.S. 555 (1963).
2U8 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions
to the general rule precluding suits against national banks in forums other than those in
counties in which the bank is "located." In Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67 (1880), the Court
held that purely "local" actions may be brought in counties other than those specified in §
94. In addition, the Court has stated that the venue privilege may be waived by a failure to
assert it, Charlotte Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889), or by conduct which could
be construed as consent to be sued, National Bank of N. America v. Associates of Obstetrics
and Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 (1976) (per curiam). Conduct sufficient to constitute
consent appears to be limited to on-going business activity within the jurisdiction, including
qualifying to do business or appointing an agent to receive service of process in a foreign
district. Id. at 462 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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99 the Appellate Division, First Department, held that,
Corporation,'
where a third-party action is brought in good faith, a suit may be
maintained against a national bank in the state courts of a county
other than the county in which the bank is located.3 1
Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel, a New York law firm, purchased a
$635,000 interest in an Oklahoma limited partnership on behalf of
its clients. 01' As an inducement to the sale, the sellers undertook to
obtain an $800,000 loan from Fidelity Bank, N.A. (Fidelity), which
is located in Oklahoma.12 The sellers also promised to buy back the
partnership interest if the loan was not obtained 3 Castle Capital
Corporation (Castle), acting as middleman, guaranteed the buyback obligation."' When the deal ultimately collapsed, 3 5 the law
firm brought a breach of contract action against Castle for the return of the purchase price.3 1 Castle thereupon impleaded 3°7 several
2" 63 App. Div. 2d 277, 407 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Ist Dep't 1978).
30

Id. at 283-84, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94.

3*

Id. at 282, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 492. These clients sought to benefit from oil tax shelters.

Id.
" Id., 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493. Securing a loan was essential if the transaction was to
generate the anticipated tax shelter benefits for the purchasers.
10 Id. at 282-83, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
3 Id. at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
m There was some dispute concerning whether the sellers actually had arranged the loan
and, if so, whether it qualified for favorable tax treatment. Id. at 282, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
' Id. at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93.
Impleader is authorized by CPLR 1,007 (1976), which provides, in pertinent part, that
a "defendant may proceed against a person~not a party who is or may be liable to him for all
'
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him ." Until recently, it was assumed that the impleader
claim must either be for the same cause of action or rest upon the same ground as the main
claim. E.g., Fladerer v. Needleman, 30 App. Div. 2d 371, 292 N.Y.S.2d 277 (3d Dep't 1968);
Ellenberg v. Sydharv Realty Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 1078, 247 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1964); accord, CPLR 1007, commentary at 35 (1976); 2 WK&M 1007.05, at 10-1117.
In Fladerer,a party who had contracted to purchase certain real property brought an
action for breach of contract to convey marketable title when he learned that the seller's title
was defective. 30 App. Div. 2d at 372-73, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The defendant seller then
impleaded the attorney who represented her when she purchased the property, alleging that
the attorney was negligent in failing to discover the defect. Id. The court dismissed the third
party claim, reasoning that the seller's liability to the plaintiff for breach of contract did not
arise from the attorney's negligence, but rather from the existence of the title defect. Id. at
374-75, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 279-80.
Using similar reasoning, the lower court in Lazarow found that, since Castle's breach of
contract with the plaintiff did not arise from the fraud and conspiracy allegedly perpetrated
by the third-party defendants, but rather from Castle's refusal to comply with its buy-back
guarantee, the third-party complaint could not be maintained. 63 App. Div. 2d at 287, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 495-96. The appellate division, however, reversed, concluding that the "best
test" of the viability of a third-party claim is "simply whether the third party defendant may
be liable to the third party plaintiff for damages for which the latter may be liable to
plaintiff." Id., 407 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (citing Norman Co. v. County of Nassau, 63 Misc. 2d 965,
969-70, 314 N.Y.S.2d 44, 50 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970)).
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parties, including Fidelity," 8 which were charged with fraud and
conspiracy."0 The Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed the
third-party complaint against Fidelity, holding that venue could
properly be laid only in a state court in a county where Fidelity, a
national bank, was "located."1 0
It appears that the departments within the appellate division are still in conflict as to
the applicability of the "Norman test." The first and second departments appear to adhere
to the more liberal Norman approach. See, e.g., Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel v. Castle Capital
Corp., 63 App. Div. 2d 277, 407 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1st Dep't 1978); Holloway v. Brooklyn Union
Gas Co., 50 App. Div. 2d 603, 375 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1975). The third and fourth
departments, on the other hand, continue to require that the third party claim rest on the
same theory as that of the main action. See, e.g., Fladerer v. Needleman, 30 App. Div. 2d
371, 292 N.Y.S.2d 277 (3d Dep't 1968); Cleveland v. Farber, 46 App. Div. 2d 733, 361
N.Y.S.2d 99 (4th Dep't 1974). Professor Siegel labels this latter approach as "rigid." D.
SIEGEL, N.Y. PRACTICE § 159, at 201 (1978).
1" 63 App. Div. 2d at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493. Castle also sought recovery from the
sellers, whose performance it had guaranteed, and from employees of Fidelity and an accounting firm which, it was claimed, had conspired in the preparation and distribution of false
documents. Id. at 285, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. These documents allegedly were misleading
in that they stated that other purchasers interested in the same type of investment had
successfully obtained the loans from Fidelity, when, in fact, the loans were not suitable for
the purposes desired by Lazarow's clients. Id. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
30 Id. at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In addition to impleading the third-party defendants
in the New York action, see note 308 supra, Castle commenced a separate suit against them
in Oklahoma, presumably to protect itself in the event that its impleader complaint was
dismissed on procedural grounds. 63 App. Div. 2d at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493. By initiating
suit immediately in Oklahoma, Castle apparently hoped to avoid being shut out of court by
that state's 2-year statute of limitations. Id. at 287, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 496. Castle then moved
in the Oklahoma court for a stay of the proceedings, probably because it feared that an early
adjudication in the Oklahoma courts would have a res judicata effect and thereby bar the
New York claim. Unable to obtain the stay in Oklahoma, however, Castle moved in New York
for an injunction restraining the third party defendants from proceeding in the Oklahoma
suit. Id. Having obtained jurisdiction over those parties by virtue of CPLR 302 (1972), the
New York supreme court assumed that its authority over the nonresidents permitted it to
enjoin them from so proceeding. 63 App. Div. 2d at 287, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 496. The court
reasoned that the requested injunction would be issued not against the Oklahoma courts, but
rather against the persons of the third party defendants. Id. at 287-88, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
30 63 App. Div. 2d at 283, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493. Inasmuch as the distribution of the
allegedly misleading documents was Fidelity's only activity in New York, it does not appear
that any of the judicially created exceptions to the mandatory venue rule of § 94 are applicable to the facts in Lazarow. See note 298 supra.
'" In addition to upholding the third-party action against Fidelity, the appellate division
found that the lower court had abused its discretion in granting Castle's request for an
injunction to prevent the third-party defendants from proceeding in the independent action
brought against them by Castle in Oklahoma. 63 App. Div. 2d at 288, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 49697; see note 309 supra. Although a New York court, by virtue of the personal jurisdiction it
has over New York domiciliaries, may enjoin them from proceeding in a foreign action, it
generally will not exercise this authority unless "extreme and extraordinary" circumstances
exist. E.B. Latham & Co. v. Mayflower Indus., 278 App. Div. 90, 94-95, 103 N.Y.S.2d 279,
282-83 (1st Dep't 1951); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 256 App. Div. 756, 758, 11
N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (1st Dep't 1939). Applying this principle in Lazarow, the appellate division
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In reversing the lower court's decision,"' the first department
concluded that New York venue was proper in a third-party action
against a national bank located in another state, provided the action
was brought "in good faith. ' 312 Justice Birns, who authored the
unanimous opinion, 3 3 declined to follow the view that the restrictive
federal venue provisions are applicable to third-party suits against
a national bank.314 Instead, the Lazarow court adopted the reasoning
of those federal district courts 315 which have concluded that "[tihe
fact that [the third-party plaintiff] is a defendant, and therefore
had no choice in the venue of the action, means that the control over
that choice which Congress attempted to exert in the National Bank
Act is not applicable. ' 31 6 Noting the possible constraint imposed
upon it by the Mercantile decision, the court found that decision to
concluded that the state's long-arm statute, CPLR 302, should not be construed so broadly
as to permit a New York court to enjoin pursuit of a foreign proceeding where the foreign
jurisdiction's highest court has refused to stay the action. 63 App. Div. 2d at 288, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 496-97. E.B. Latham and ParamountPictureswere decided before the enactment
of CPLR 302. Nevertheless, the important policy considerations of reciprocal "courtesy" and
"mutual respect," for a foreign jurisdiction's ruling, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923), would seem equally applicable
to the situation in Lazarow. Thus, it would appear that New York courts are precluded from
indirectly overriding the decision of a foreign court, despite the availability of "long arm"
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.
312 63 App. Div. 2d at 284, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94. Although the suit concerned property
located in Oklahoma, the contracts of sale were executed in New York and the suit arose out
of this transaction. Based on Castle's showing of purposeful concerted activity in which all
the defendants allegedly participated, the Lazarow court determined that it had obtained
personal jurisdiction over the defendants by virtue of CPLR 302. 63 App. Div. 2d at 285-86,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
311The panel consisted of Justices Kupferman, Birns, Evans, Sullivan and Murphy, P.J.
"1 63 App. Div. 2d at 284, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 494 (citing Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v.
Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Swiss Israel Trade Bank v.
Mobley, 319 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970)). The Swiss Israel court held that § 94 of the
National Bank Act, see note 296 supra, is applicable to third-party suits, since such suits are
"just as much of an action against a national bank as a suit brought directly against [the
bank]." 319 F. Supp. at 375. Moreover, the court reasoned, "Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [permitting impleader] cannot undo what Congress specially provided as
to suits against national banks," since "the rule-making authority must yield to the legislative power." Id.; cf. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1976) (venue
provision of 12 U.S.C. § 94 is controlling over venue provision of Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976)).
Jones v. Kreminski, 404 F. Supp. 667 (D. Conn. 1975); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The third-party defendant in Odette was a national
bank which had been impleaded under FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The court raised the venue
question sua sponte and held that, where venue is proper in the main action, it is not a valid
defense that the third party action would not have been permitted if brought alone. 394 F.
Supp. at 951 (citing 3 MooRE's
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M1,
404 F. Supp. at 669; see 63 App. Div. 2d at 284, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
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be inapplicable to the issues in Lazarow, since Mercantile "[did]
not discuss third-party actions."3 '
The Lazarow court's determination that the federal venue provision governing actions against national banks is inapplicable to
third-party claims appears to be in direct conflict with both congressional intent318 and pertinent Supreme Court decisions. 3'1 In permit-

ting Castle to do as a third-party plaintiff what it could not do as a
plaintiff, the first department's decision also appears to diverge
from other states' decisions dealing with similar issues. 32 0 While the

"1?
63 App. Div. 2d

at 284 n.2, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 494 n.2.
In restricting the forums in which suit properly may be brought against a national
3,"
'bank to those districts or counties in which the bank is "established" or "located," it was
the intention of Congress to prevent "untoward interruption of a national bank's business."
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 43 (1977) (citations omitted). Enacted as
an emergency financial stabilization measure during the Civil War, the original statute was
revised in 1864 and was commonly known as the National Bank Act. Hicks, Banking and
Venue: Fitting the Horse and Buggy Statute to a Supersonic Age, 29 MERCER L. REV. 797,
800 (1978).
"I See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976); Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963). Mercantile involved a conspiracy suit brought in a state
court against 145 defendants, two of which were national banks. Id. at 556. The Mercantile
C~urt held that these banks could not be sued in a state court in a county other than the
county in which the banks were located, although the obvious result was that all the defendants could not be gathered together and sued in a single action. Id. at 561. Significantly,
the Court found that the inconvenience to the plaintiff of having to maintain separate suits
against the banks was an "insufficient basis for departing from the command of the federal
statute." Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted). A similar issue was raised in Radzanower, which
involved a suit brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Enacted after the
National Bank Act, this statute contains its own venue provision permitting a defendant to
be sued wherever he may be found. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the venue provision of the Securities Act constituted an implied repeal of the
narrower provision of the National Bank Act, the Radzanower Court stated that § 94 had not
been "submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum." 426 U.S.
at 153. See also National Bank of N. America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery,
Inc., 425 U.S. 460 (1976) (per curiam).
The language in these decisions indicates the Court's belief that, absent waiver, it was
the intention of Congress that only in those courts designated in the statute "could a national
bank be sued against its will." 426 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted). This would appear to leave
little room for interpretation and renders the validity of the decision in Lazarow highly
questionable.
12 Although state courts outside New York apparently have not been confronted with
the precise issue presented in Lazarow, they have addressed similar questions arising under
§ 94 of the National Bank Act. For example, in Security First Nat'l Bank v. Tattersall, 311
So. 2d 218 (La. 1975), the court held that the venue provisions of § 94 are applicable in any
suit against a national bank, regardless of the procedural posture in which the suit is presented. 311 So. 2d at 222. Similarly, in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Avtek, Inc., 134 Vt. 392,
360 A.2d 80 (1976), a Vermont court refused to permit a counterclaim brought against a
national bank which was located in another state, although the bank had initiated a foreclosure action in a Vermont state court. Finally, in Drum v. District Court, 169 Mont. 494, 548
P.2d 1377 (1976), the court concluded that § 94 "even prevents joinder in the same action of
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restrictive venue statute governing suits against national banks has
been criticized heavily, 32' the weight of authority indicates that its
by judicially created exceptions
mandatory rule may not be diluted 322
Lazarow.
in
suggested
that
as
such
When Congress enacted the venue provision, it was cognizant
of the inconvenience caused a national bank by its being forced to
defend in a foreign forum.3 23 Since the statute was passed with this
in mind, the interest of national banks must have been deemed to
outweigh the interest a plaintiff has in bringing a consolidated action. Thus it would appear that, until Congress acts to amend this
section, state courts should dismiss third-party actions brought
against national banks not "located" in the county in which suit is
32 4
brought.
Anne A. Dillon
national banks located in different states or districts who were sued for damages based on a
civil conspiracy to defraud." 169 Mont. at 499, 548 P.2d at 1382 (citations omitted); cf.
Metropolitan Dade County v. Kelly, 348 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (third party
complaint against county dismissed for improper venue under statute permitting suits
against state subdivisions only where headquarters located).
21 See, e.g., Staley v. Homeland, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (mem.);
Chaffee v. Glens Falls Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Misc. 181, 123 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1953). The Chaffee court stated:
The inconvenience and the interruptions of banking business thus discussed in
1889, have today been mitigated, if not, in fact, minimized, by present modes of
rapid transportation and communication and by mechanical and electronic accounting systems and photostatic and microfilming processes, . . . and the present
• . . liberalization of the rules respecting documentary evidence have further eased
the burden incident to litigation in which banks may be involved. Thus the supposed objective of the statute has been in large part attained through other means.
Id. at 183-84, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 638. Similarly, the American Law Institute has flatly stated
that § 94 "is impossible to defend" and has recommended repeal of this section, since
"[tihere is no obvious reason why a national bank acquires a unique and restrictive venue
rule, and cannot be treated as is any other corporation for purposes of venue." ALI STUDY OF
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OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

CoulRs 412-13 (1969); accord,

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 161-62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
generally Hicks, supra note 318, at 800-01; Steinberg, supra note 4, at 178-79. Professor
Steinberg argues that the application of § 94 today "confers a privileged status to national
banks at the expense of individual citizens." Steinberg, supra note 4, at 179 (footnotes
omitted). See also Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Mobley, 319 F. Supp. 374,375 (S.D. Ga. 1970)
(quoting Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970)).
m See notes 298, 318-320 supra.
3 Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of
Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 144 (1889).
3' Accord, Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Mobley, 319 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970). In Swiss
Israel, the court, while noting the inconvenience § 94 imposes on litigants, stated that the
"remedy for the situation must be provided by Congress." 319 F. Supp. at 375 (quoting Klein
v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970)). It should be noted that, despite the criticisms leveled at § 94, Congress did not repeal the venue provision when it reexamined the National
Bank Act in an attempt to eliminate "certain [national banking] laws which ha[d] become
obsolete." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 158 n.16 (1976).

